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1. Introduction 
The topic focused on in the present paper is the relationship between dubitative questions 
(Stivers and Enfield 2010) and epistemic stance (Heritage 2012a, 2012b), specifically 
between polar questions (polar interrogatives, tag and declarative questions) which include 
a lexical marker of doubt/uncertainty and the questioner’s epistemic position those 
questions come from. The analysis of this relationship inevitably leads us to take into 
consideration alternative and wh-questions as well. 
 
1.1 Epistemic stance 
Many studies have been dedicated to the communication of epistemic stance (see, among 
others, Biber and Finegan 1989; Ochs 1996; Kärkkäinen 2003; Biber 2004; Du Bois 2007; 
Englebretson 2007; Keisanen 2007; Jaffe 2009; Chindamo et al. 2012, etc.). With the term 
epistemic stance or epistemic position (which we treat as synonymous) some authors refer 
to speakers’ commitment towards the truth of the propositional content being 
communicated (see, for example, Chindamo et al. 2012); for other authors, the source of 
information / modes of knowing should also be included in the concept of epistemic stance 
(see for example, Ochs 1996). Our view is closer to the latter perspective: epistemic 
stance refers to both the epistemic (commitment) and the evidential (source of information) 
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positions which speakers assume during communication, and which they express through 
lexical and grammatical means ((Zuczkowski et al., 2014, 2017). 
In the field of Conversation Analysis, the main frame of reference on epistemic stance 
is that of John Heritage and colleagues’ studies (see, for example, Heritage and Raymond 
2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006; Heritage 2010, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014; 
Stivers et al. 2011; Mondada 2013; Hayano 2014). In particular, regarding questions, 
these studies focus on the correlation between different question types and different 
knowledge gaps (different epistemic gradients) between a less knowledgeable questioner 
(K-) who lacks a piece of information, and a more knowledgeable answerer (K+) who has 
or is supposed to have that information. For instance, the different epistemic gradients 
established by questions such as (Q1) Who did you talk to? (wh-question), (Q2) Did you 
talk to John? (polar interrogative), (Q3) You talked to John, didn’t you? (tag question), (Q4) 
You talked to John? (declarative question) are illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
 
Figure 1. Epistemic gradient (Heritage and Raymond 2012: 181): distinctive epistemic gaps for four different question designs 
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farthest from the answerer’s K+, since a wh-question, “claiming no knowledge concerning 
the target state of affairs, expresses the largest knowledge gap and the steepest epistemic 
gradient” (Heritage and Raymond 2012: 181). Conversely, the declarative question Q4 is 
the nearest to the answerer’s K+ and the farthest from the questioner’s K-. 
 
1.2 Dubitative questions 
Question types have been extensively investigated in different disciplines focused on 
language study including linguistics, philosophy of language, anthropology, Conversation 
Analysis (Enfield et al. 2010), and from a range of perspectives: formal, functional, 
interactional being the most prominent (see, for example, Steensing and Drew 2008; 
Freed and Ehrlich 2010; de Ruiter 2012).  
A systematic cross-linguistic overview of the pragmatics of questions and their 
responses in everyday conversations was carried out within the Multimodal Interaction 
Project at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics. This study aimed to qualitatively 
describe and quantitatively document the ways in which speakers design and use 
questions and responses in ten different languages from five continents (Stivers, Enfield 
and Levinson 2010). The team of ten researchers, each working on a different language, 
developed and used the same scheme for coding 350 question-response sequences, each 
in their own language-specific corpus of video-taped conversations in a range of dyadic 
and multi-participants interactions1. The details of the coding scheme, including 
explanations of each coding category, are described in Stivers and Enfield (2010). In line 
                                                           
1
 “The coding scheme was developed through two cycles of pilot coding and evaluation, involving the 
application of draft coding categories to data from different languages, and collaborative discussion of 
conceptual and analytic issues that arose” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2620). 
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with previous studies (Quirk et al. 1985; Biber et al. 1999), three primary question types 
are identified: wh-questions, alternative questions and polar questions. The latter are 
further subdivided in three sub-types: polar interrogatives, tag questions, and declarative 
questions. The authors “feel that the scheme is empirically well-grounded and analytically 
well-motivated, and stands a good chance of usefully handling the kinds of distinctions in 
this domain that are likely to be relevant for any language in any cultural setting” (Stivers 
and Enfield 2010: 2620). 
 
1.3 Point 7 of the coding scheme 
The topic that most interests us, and from which we take our cue for the present paper, is 
of secondary importance in the coding scheme but is, in our view, of great theoretical 
importance from an epistemic perspective; it falls within the section of the coding scheme 
devoted to polar questions, which are defined as follows: 
 
1.3.1 Polar questions: definition and sub-types  
“A polar question is any question that makes relevant affirmation/confirmation or 
disconfirmation. It contains a proposition with two possible answers in semantic terms: 
true/the case versus not true/not the case. The question might involve a question particle, 
inversion, or a tag. It did not necessarily involve formal interrogative marking (as in a 
declarative question). It could be positive or negative” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2621).  
Therefore, “polar questions are consistently said to be answered with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’ 
in English. Interrogative, tag and declarative questions make up the dominant sub-types of 
polar questions” (Stivers 2010: 2773).  
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What attracted our attention within the section of the coding scheme devoted to polar 
questions was point number 7, which requires that the researcher, who has already coded 
a polar question in his/her own corpus, considers the following aspect: 
 
“(7) Is the polar question dubitative (‘Maybe’) marked? 
0=No  
1=Yes 
9=N/A (non-polar questions)  
Among polar questions, if the question had a marker of doubt/uncertainty in it (e.g., ‘I 
wonder if’) then it was coded as dubitative. (This appears to be a grammaticalized way to 
do polar questions in some languages)” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2622).  
 
The example markers maybe and I wonder if given in the above quotation seem to indicate 
that the authors are referring to lexical markers of doubt/uncertainty (from here on 
abbreviated to ULM, Uncertainty Lexical Marker), and that both direct (maybe) and indirect 
(I wonder if) questions are taken into account2.  
In other words, as we understand it, a direct polar question seems to be coded as 
dubitative when it includes a ULM, for example the adverb maybe; an indirect polar 
question seems to be coded as dubitative when it is introduced by a ULM such as the 
verbal expression I wonder if. In short, polar questions seem to be coded as dubitative 
when they include a ULM, independently of whether they are direct or indirect.  
What is said in parentheses at the end of the above quotation (Stivers and Enfield 
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 When referring to questions, we use indirect as synonymous with embedded. 
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2010) leads us to assume that, at least in some languages3, speakers must use this 
“grammaticalized way” in order to make polar questions. In other words, they are 
constrained to do so by the rules of their grammar, which provides for that particular 
question design. Of course, this is not the case in English and in many other languages, 
including French, German, Spanish, and Italian, where a question does not require the 
presence of a ULM in order to be polar. Let us consider polar interrogatives, a sub-type of 
polar questions: in order to formulate a polar interrogative, English speakers only need to 
say, e.g., “Is it snowing outside?”, without any need for an additional dubitative adverb 
maybe, since English grammar envisages a morphosyntactic design (subject-verb 
inversion, rising intonation) which is the basic way of forming polar interrogatives4. 
English speakers may also say “Is it maybe snowing outside?”, i.e. they choose to add 
a ULM to the basic morphosyntactic design. In other words, polar interrogatives may 
include a ULM, but do not have to: the presence of a ULM is not obligatory, only optional. 
It is precisely this point that requires further investigation from an epistemic perspective: 
why is it that in English and in many other languages, polar questions allow for the 
presence of a ULM, while other question types do not? 
It is worth drawing attention to the fact that point 7 of Stivers and Enfield’s coding 
scheme is limited to polar questions (interrogatives, tags, declaratives): it is not extended 
to wh- and alternative questions. In other words, point 7 and the coding scheme as a 
whole seem to assume that only polar questions can be dubitative, i.e. include a ULM, 
while wh- and alternative questions cannot. If this is indeed the case, what explanation can 
                                                           
3
 Like, for example, in Tzeltal, a Mayan language (Brown 2010). 
4
 The terms grammatical and morphosyntactic are used synonymously. 
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we put forward?  
As an initial quick answer, we can use Stivers and Enfield’s dubitative example 
markers maybe and I wonder if as linguistic tests by adding them to plain wh-questions 
e.g., “How is the weather outside?”. What emerges is that, generally, we can say neither 
*“How is maybe the weather outside?” nor *”I wonder if how the weather is outside”. So, 
the problem is to uncover why, from an epistemic perspective, wh-questions cannot be 
dubitative. 
If we apply the same two tests to an alternative question like “Were you drunk or were 
you sober?”, we have “I wonder if you were drunk or you were sober” and, among other 
possibilities, “Were you maybe drunk or were you sober?” Both indirect and direct 
questions are possible, in plausible contexts. Thus, although the coding scheme seems to 
establish that only polar questions can be dubitative, alternative questions also have the 
potential to be so. Again, our interest lies in understanding why this should be the case. 
Another related aspect concerns only dubitative questions (the group of polar question 
types and alternative questions): speakers can say both “Is it snowing outside?” and “Is it 
maybe snowing outside?”. The problem is to ascertain whether there is any epistemic 
difference between these two questions, i.e. between the dubitative question (with maybe) 
and its plain equivalent (without maybe)5. 
Specifically, we are interested in uncovering whether the presence or absence of a 
ULM in polar interrogatives, tag, declarative and alternative questions changes anything in 
the questioners’ commitment, by enhancing or reducing uncertainty. Put more simply: 
                                                           
5
 From here on, questions without a ULM like “Is it snowing outside?” will be called plain questions while 
those with a ULM like “Is it maybe snowing outside?” (or like “I wonder if it is snowing outside” in the 
corresponding indirect form) will be called dubitative questions. 
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does a dubitative question express greater uncertainty than its corresponding plain 
question? To the best of our knowledge, these three problems have not yet been 
addressed with specific reference to epistemic stance.  
 
1.4 Research questions 
The present paper aims to address the aforementioned and intertwined problems from the 
perspective of epistemic stance, in line with Heritage’s general model which addresses 
epistemic status6 and epistemic stance7, a less knowledgeable (K-) questioner and a more 
knowledgeable (K+) answerer in the epistemic gradient. In particular, it asks: (1) why it is 
that polar and alternative questions may include a ULM, i.e. may be dubitative; (2) why wh-
questions may not do so; (3) what empirical evidence can support the claim that both polar 
and alternative questions can be dubitative while wh-questions cannot, and (4) whether 
the presence of a ULM in polar and alternative questions indicates a different epistemic 
commitment compared to that expressed in the corresponding plain questions and, if so, 
what changes can be identified. Research questions 1 and 2 will be addressed in Part 1, 
which is devoted to plain questions. Research questions 3 and 4 will be addressed in Part 
2, which is devoted to dubitative questions. 
 
  
                                                           
6
 “[…] the distribution of rights and responsibilities regarding what participants can accountably know, how 
they know it, whether they have rights to describe it” (Heritage and Raymond 2005, 15). 
7
 “Epistemic stance concerns how speakers position themselves in terms of epistemic status in and through 
the design of turns at talk” (Heritage 2012b: 33). 
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2. Part 1: Why polar and alternative questions may be dubitative while wh-questions may 
not  
2.1 A preliminary answer 
Why polar and alternative questions may include a ULM while wh-questions may not, can 
be explored by proposing a distinction, within the K- position in Heritage’s model, between 
the questioner’s lack of information, i.e. lack of knowledge, on the one hand, and lack of 
certainty regarding the information, on the other8. 
Different types of question design express either a lack of knowledge (= un-
knowledge, ignorance) or a lack of certainty (= uncertainty). Wh-questions convey a lack of 
knowledge concerning a wh-word. In contrast, polar interrogatives, tag, declarative and 
alternative questions express a lack of certainty concerning the truthfulness of a 
proposition; alternative questions do so with regard to two such propositions. In this sense, 
wh-questions are unknowing questions, i.e. they come from a specific epistemic stance 
that represents the questioner’s unknowing position. The other four types are uncertain 
questions, i.e. they come from an epistemic stance that represents the questioner’s 
uncertain position.  
 
2.2 The uncertain position 
The uncertain position includes everything that speakers communicate – lexically or 
morphosyntactically – as being uncertain, possible, probable, supposed, assumed, 
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 In our view, this distinction is implicit in Heritage and Raymond’s (2012: 180-181) statement: “the act of 
questioning, however it is managed, invokes a claim that the questioner lacks certain information (or lacks 
certainty about it). We will refer to this as a ‘K-’ position”. 
 believed, doubted, suspected
sense of uncertainty expressed through negative particles and affixes, e.g.
whether…; I’m not sure that…; I’m uncertain about…,
encompasses possibility and subjectivity. 
(can, may, must, might, could
and with a range of epistemic adjectives and/or adverbs, e.g.
Subjectivity, i.e. the communication of the speaker’s point of view, is typically expressed 
with verbs of opinion (I think, I suppose, I doubt, I guess,
(e.g., in my opinion, personally, in my view, to my 
The uncertain position can be thought of as an epistemic co
between two opposing poles of 
p (B), where p stands for a proposition
Figure 
 
The NKW pole indicates the maximum degree of uncertainty 
speaker does not know whether
Sentences like I do not know whether I’ll go to the movie or not  
I’ll go to the movie or to the theatre
not know whether p or non p 
, etc. As these expressions suggest, as well as the strict 
 etc., this epistemic positio
Possibility is expressed by epistemic modals 
) referring both to present and possible (conditional) time, 
, it is pos
 etc.) and related expressions 
mind, etc.). 
ntinuum which ranges 
not knowing whether p or non p (NKW
 (see Figure 2).  
 
2: The two poles of the uncertain position 
(in the
 the information s/he is communicating is 
and I do not know whether 
, i.e. whose design can be formally represented as 
and I do not know whether p
1
 or p
2 
, usually express
10 
, I do not know 
n also 
sible/probable, etc. 
) and believing that 
 
 strict sense): the 
true or false. 
I do 
 that p 
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and non p, and p
1
 and p
2
, respectively, have an equal possibility of being true and that the 
speaker is equally uncertain about the two possibilities: no indication of considering one of 
the options as being more probable than the other is given; both options are possibly true 
to the same degree (50%-50%). This proportion represents the maximum degree of 
uncertainty. 
The B pole, on the contrary, represents a lower, i.e. minimum, degree of uncertainty 
(uncertainty in the sense of speaker subjectivity): the speaker communicates the 
information as something s/he believes is true (or false). Sentences like I believe that I’ll go 
to the movie, i.e. sentences whose design can be formally represented as I believe that p, 
normally convey that, though the speaker does not know whether p is true or false, s/he is 
nonetheless inclined to believe that the explicit (lexicalised) positive alternative (p) is more 
likely to be true than the implicit (not lexicalised) negative one (non p). This design allows 
the speaker to indicate a preference for p, which is assigned a higher degree of probability 
of being true than non p. From equal probability (NKW pole) the speaker’s commitment 
moves gradually towards unequal probability (B pole), from maximum uncertainty to 
minimum uncertainty. 
It is important to note the difference between not knowing whether (uncertainty / 
uncertain position) and not knowing (unknowledge / unknowing position): information 
which is communicated as unknown involves absence of knowledge (I don’t know at all, I 
have no idea, I don’t have the faintest idea) rather than beliefs or suppositions which are 
unconfirmed or uncertain. When communicated from the unknowing position, i.e. as 
unknown to the speaker, information is conveyed via its absence, for example when a 
speaker says I do not know where Alex is or asks Where is Alex?. Here the speaker is 
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communicating that s/he lacks information concerning the place where Alex is. Since the 
unknowing position is marked by the absence of information, it communicates neither 
certainty nor uncertainty both of which require the information to be present. The 
information gap characterising the unknowing position therefore corresponds to a 
commitment void: the speaker cannot commit her-/himself to that which s/he does not 
know. 
Thus, when the speaker communicates information as certain, s/he also 
communicates it as something s/he knows to be true (knowing position); on the contrary, 
when s/he communicates information as uncertain, s/he also communicates it as 
something s/he does not know to be either true or false, or as something s/he believes is 
either true or false (uncertain position). When s/he communicates the information as 
neither certain nor uncertain, s/he also communicates it as unknown (unknowing 
position)9. 
From this perspective, communication may be seen as originating in the speaker, who 
assumes one of the three epistemic positions, and directed at the interlocutor, who in turn 
assumes one of the three. Indeed, the interlocutor can reply from any of the three 
epistemic positions, either aligning or misaligning with the speaker’s position (Riccioni et 
al. 2014; Vincze et al. 2016; Zuczkowsli et al. 2017). 
 
  
                                                           
9
 In this paper, the term uncertain is reserved for the corresponding epistemic position, while the term 
dubitative is reserved for questions that include a ULM. 
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2.3 Aims of Part 1 
The initial explanation given above, which offers a general picture as to why polar and 
alternative questions may include a ULM while wh-questions may not, will be discussed in 
greater detail over the next five sections, where particular reference will be made to the 
different epistemic positions those questions come from (unknowing vs uncertain position) 
and the different degrees of uncertainty (from not knowing whether to believing) existing 
within the uncertain position. 
Section 2.5 aims to show that wh-questions come from the unknowing position, not the 
uncertain, and argues that this is why they cannot include a ULM. 
Sections 2.6-2.9 aim to show that the epistemic design of alternative questions, polar 
interrogatives, tag and declarative questions is already uncertain at the morphosyntactic 
level as can be appreciated from the plain question forms, hence they come from the 
uncertain position. For this reason, they do not need a ULM in order to communicate 
uncertainty. This is also why, in principle, they may include it, since ULMs are perfectly 
compatible with the uncertainty already encoded in the plain question forms. 
Additionally, sections 2.6-2.9 aim to show that the four types of questions are 
uncertain to variable degrees, each one occupying a different space on the epistemic 
continuum (Figure 2) which ranges between the poles of not knowing whether (NKW) and 
believing (B): alternative questions and polar interrogatives are closer to the NKW pole, 
while tag and declarative questions are closer to the B pole. 
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2.4 Methodology  
In Stivers, Enfield and Levinson (2010), as we have said, ten different language-specific 
corpora of question-response sequences were analysed by ten different researchers, all 
following the same coding scheme. The American English corpus was analysed by Stivers 
(2010); for each question type, she cites at least one canonical example taken from the 
corpus.  
We will treat these examples as representative of the five question types we are going 
to discuss from the perspective of epistemic stance, using them as a basis from which to 
address our investigations. In a similar vein, the definitions of the different question types 
are for the most part taken from Stivers (2010) and Stivers and Enfield (2010). 
The sections that follow all have the same organisational structure: definition of the 
specific type of question under examination; quotation of one example taken from Stivers 
(2010); epistemic analysis and discussion of the example. 
 
2.5 Wh-questions  
Definition: 
“A content or ‘Q-word’ question (or ‘WH’ question) is where part of a proposition is 
presupposed, and the utterance seeks the identity of one element of the proposition. Thus, 
in ‘Who stole my newspaper’ it is presupposed that ‘Someone stole my newspaper’, and 
the purpose of the question (at least nominally) is to ascertain the identity of the person 
corresponding to this ‘someone’” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2621).  
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Example (1) 
“Here a man and a woman are discussing the cost of boxing training – something Jess has 
been asking questions about over the past several sequences” (Stivers 2010: 2773). 
 
Jess: How much does it cost tuh just (.) like (.) train. 
 (0.9) 
Mike: Sixty nine, 
 
(Stivers 2010: 2775) 
 
For our purposes, in Jess’s question the phonetic transcription tuh and the expression just 
like are superfluous. Thus, for simplicity’s sake, we can reduce Jess’s question as:  
 
How much does it cost to train? 
 
According to the definition quoted above, example (1) linguistically presupposes that to 
train costs something, i.e. that the proposition to train costs something is true (Heritage 
2010: 47-48)10. Since Jess does not know how much it costs and is interested in knowing, 
she poses a question which seeks to establish the identity of one element (how much, the 
cost of the boxing training) and whose purpose is to ascertain the quantity of money 
corresponding to how much. In this sense wh-questions are information-seeking 
                                                           
10
 As regards presuppositions and truth in pragmatics, see also Lyons (1977); Levinson (1983) Chapter 4; 
Clayman (1993); Clayman and Heritage (2002); Heritage (2003). 
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questions: they expect an open-ended answer, that provides information on the specific 
wh-word featured in the question. 
In example (1), Jess is seeking a piece of information she does not possess (K-, in 
Heritage (2014) terminology) and Mike is assumed to have (K+). This piece of information 
is entirely unknown to Jess; it is missing, absent, an information void. She asks for 
information belonging to Mike’s epistemic domain (Heritage 2014) because he knows (or is 
expected to know) the cost. In this sense, Jess’s question comes from her unknowing 
position and is directed to Mike’s knowing one. Mike’s answer (Sixty nine) aligns with 
Jess’s expectations. Indeed, Mike replies from a knowing position by indicating the 
amount. 
Jess’s epistemic position (unknowing) is made explicit if we transform the direct 
interrogative (How much does it cost to train?) into the corresponding indirect one, using 
the introducing verb to know (Biber et al. 1999: 976): 
  
(a) I do not know how much it costs to train 
 
The expression I do not know signals Jess's total lack of knowledge (ignorance) 
concerning how much. Thus, in a formal way, the epistemic design of wh-questions may 
be represented as follows: 
 
(a
1
) I do not know + p  
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where p is the proposition that constitutes the question, in our case how much it costs to 
train. 
 
2.6 Alternative questions 
Definition 
Alternative questions include “the proposal of a restricted set of alternative answers in their 
formulation (e.g., ‘Were you drunk or were you sober.’ or ‘Do you want corn or flour 
tortillas.’)” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2622), i.e. they are “designed to provide the recipient 
with two or more options to choose from for the answer” (Rossano 2010: 2758).  
 
Example (2) 
Stivers’ (2010: 2775) example (below) is incorporated into the definition just provided: 
 
Lanie: Were you drunk or were you sober? 
Ingrid: I wasn’t- I wasn’t sober but ( ) 
 
In example (2), Lanie asks Ingrid to choose between the two alternatives. The question 
design conveys that, for Lanie, either of the two is equally possible; she is equally 
uncertain between them and Ingrid’s response is expected to reveal which of the two is 
true. The expressions equally possible and equally uncertain mean that, in using such a 
question design, Lanie recognises that both options are possibly true to the same degree: 
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she gives no indication of considering one of the options as being more (or less) probable 
than the other. 
This proportion (50%-50%) represents the maximum degree of uncertainty, in the 
sense that there is equal probability of both alternatives being true. Alternative questions 
can therefore be seen as coming from the not knowing whether pole of the uncertain 
position. Such questions are information-seeking rather than confirmation-seeking, in that 
the questioner’s expectations concerning the interlocutor’s response are neutral (both 
alternatives are expected to the same degree), not oriented in favour of either p
1
 (you were 
drunk) or p
2 
(you were sober)11. 
If we transform the direct question Were you drunk or were you sober? into the 
corresponding indirect one, again using the verb to know, from an epistemic perspective 
we have: 
 
(b) I do not know whether you were drunk or you were sober 
 
More formally, the epistemic design of alternative questions may be represented as 
follows: 
 
(b
1
) I do not know whether + p
1
 or p
2
 
                                                           
11
 There is a second type of alternative question whose design is p or non p? , e.g. Will you go to the movie 
or (will you) not?, where the second alternative (you will not go to the movie) is the negation of the first one 
(you will go to the movie). This second type of alternative question is not mentioned in Stivers and Enfield 
(2010), probably because it is included by the authors in the first type of alternative question, but it is very 
interesting also in order to understand the two possible different readings of the design of polar 
interrogatives, as we will see in the next section. 
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where p
1 
is the first alternative provided by Lanie to Ingrid (you were drunk) and p
2 
the 
second (you were sober).  
What both representations have in common is the expression I do not know 
whether…or…, which makes explicit the questioner’s epistemic position and conveys 
effectively the sense of epistemic uncertainty between the two alternatives that the 
questioner is faced with. 
If we were to place I do not know before p
1
 and p
2 
(see section 2.5), this would give 
rise to a grammatically unacceptable sentence:  
 
* I do not know you were drunk or you were sober 
 
The expression I do not know suits wh-questions only; it does not suit alternative questions 
nor does it suit polar interrogatives, tag and declarative questions, which instead require I 
do not know whether.  
The transformation from direct to indirect questions with their suitable epistemic 
complement (I do not know vs I do not know whether) can be considered a linguistic test 
aimed at checking whether a question is unknowing or uncertain.  
In this sense, alternative questions can be thought of as uncertain: they express a lack 
of certainty concerning two alternatives, rather than a lack of knowledge. Wh-questions, on 
the other hand, communicate lack of knowledge concerning a wh-word. In wh-questions, 
the questioner aims to find out an unknown element (how much does it cost?) within a 
state of affairs presupposed to be true, i.e. as known (it costs something). In alternative 
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questions, however, the matter at hand is to find out which of two possible states of affairs 
is true12. 
In example (2), Lanie does not know whether Ingrid was drunk or sober; she is 
interested in finding out something that only Ingrid knows since it belongs to her own 
epistemic domain of knowledge. Since Ingrid has chosen one of the two provided 
alternatives as her answer, claiming that she was not sober, her reply aligns with Lanie’s 
expectations. 
To sum up, Lanie’s question comes from the not knowing whether pole of her 
uncertain position, while Ingrid’s answer comes from her knowing position. 
 
2.7 Polar interrogatives 
Definition 
 “With a polar question – e.g., Is it still snowing outside? –  a speaker makes reference to a 
complete proposition (in this case, ‘It's still snowing outside’), and expresses a lack of 
knowledge as to the truth of this proposition. A typical communicative function of a 
question is to induce the addressee to state whether the proposition is true (yes or 
equivalent) or false (no or equivalent)” (Enfield et al. 2012: 193).  
 
Example (3) 
Stivers (2010: 2774) gives one canonical example of polar interrogatives: 
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 Of course, neither is necessarily true: the interlocutor might propose an intermediate or ulterior possibility, 
such as “I only had one beer” to “Were you drunk or were you sober?”, or “I’d prefer rice” to “Do you want 
corn or flour tortillas?” 
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“Here a couple is having dinner and Kim, following a lapse in the conversation, asks about 
the broaching of a topic among Mark’s co-workers: 
 
Kim: So did anybody say anything about thuh bar tuhday? 
(2.0) 
Mark: Yeah,  
(.)  
Mark: Customers, 
 
The question involves both the inversion of the do-auxiliary and the shift from the assertive 
forms ‘somebody’ and ‘something’ typical in the declarative context to the non-assertive 
‘anybody’ and ‘anything’ typical of the interrogative context (Quirk et al. 1985)”.  
 
For our purposes, in Kim’s question the discursive marker so and the phonematic 
transcriptions thuh and tuhday are superfluous. Thus, for simplicity’s sake, we can 
reformulate Kim’s question as:  
 
Did anybody say anything about the bar today? 
 
Following Enfield et al.’s definition, quoted above, the complete proposition p referred to by 
the speaker in this question is somebody said something about the bar today. Kim’s 
uncertainty here regards whether p is true or false. In this case, truth and falsehood refers 
to just one proposition, not to two as in alternative questions. It is as if the question were: 
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Is it true or false that somebody said something about the bar today?  Different from wh-
questions, where p is presupposed to be true, and similar to alternative questions, where 
both options are possibly true, the question design of example (3), and of polar 
interrogatives in general, leaves two possibilities open (Heritage 2010: 47), that p is true 
and that p is false, and conveys that, for Kim, as for Jess’s alternative question in the 
previous section, either of the two alternatives is equally possible, i.e. that Kim is equally 
uncertain between the two possibilities. Mark’s response is expected to let her know which 
one is true. If Mark’s reply is yes, then p is true, which means that somebody said 
something about the bar today. Conversely, if Mark’s reply is no, then p is false, which 
means that nobody said anything about the bar today. Since nobody said anything about 
the bar today is the negative opposite of p, the alternatives in polar interrogatives may also 
be thought of as being p or non p. In this sense, example (3) expresses the questioner’s 
uncertainty about which of the two propositions is true: p or non p? It is as if the question 
were: Did anybody say anything about the bar today, or did nobody say anything about the 
bar today? The implicit alternative can be abbreviated as or not (i.e. Did anybody say 
anything about the bar today, or not?). Only one of the two alternatives is made explicit 
(the positive one, p)13. 
                                                           
13
 Possibly for these or similar reasons, in the linguistic literature there are two opposite views on the design 
of polar interrogatives: some authors (Coleman, 1914; Palmer, 1922; Dietrich, 1937; Katz and Postal, 1964; 
Stockwell, Schachter and Hall Partee, 1968; Harris, 1968; Langacker, 1970; etc.) suggest that a polar 
interrogative is nothing but an incomplete alternative question, i.e. a special type of alternative question in 
which the second alternative (or not) has been suppressed and remains implicit, not lexicalised. Bolinger 
(1957, 1978), on the contrary, claims that a polar interrogative advances a hypothesis for confirmation: it 
“hypothesizes that something is true and confirmed, amended, or disconfirmed by an interlocutor” (Bolinger 
1978, 102). Both readings are plausible in principle, in the sense that, due to the context in which they occur, 
their turn sequential position and propositional content, some polar interrogatives seem to fit better in 
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Thus, if we transform the direct question Did anybody say anything about the bar 
today? into its corresponding indirect one, again using the introducing verb to know in such 
a way as to make Kim’s epistemic position explicit (Biber et al. 1999), we have:  
 
(c) I do not know whether anybody said anything about the bar today (or not) 
 
Since or not is the abbreviation of or non p, the epistemic design of polar interrogatives 
may be represented in a more formal way as:  
 
(c
1
) I do not know whether + p (or non p) 
 
In this case too, as in alternative questions, the suitable expression to be placed before p 
is I do not know whether. If we placed I do not know before p, as we did with wh-questions, 
we would end up with a grammatically unacceptable sentence: 
 
* I do not know anybody said anything about the bar today  
 
Analogously to alternative questions, what the above representations (c
1
) and (c
2
)
 
have in 
common is the expression I do not know whether… or…, which conveys a sense of 
epistemic uncertainty between the two alternatives that the questioner is faced with.  
In this respect, polar interrogatives and alternative questions are similar, but they differ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Coleman’s reading, while some others seem to fit better in Bolinger’s. Evidence for these two different 
readings is given by Stivers’s quantitative results (2010: 2776, Table 3). 
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in terms of (i) explicitation (lexicalization) of the alternatives, and (ii) obligation to feature 
polar opposites: in alternative questions the alternatives p
1
 and p
2
 are both explicit, 
lexicalised, and their semantic content is, in principle, different, e.g., Do you want corn or 
flour tortillas?; such a difference can, however, include semantic opposition, i.e. drunk / 
sober in Were you drunk or were you sober?. In polar interrogatives, the alternatives p and 
non p, i.e. a positive and its negative counterpart, are grammatical opposites, in the sense 
that the second contains non. Of course, the presence of such alternatives (p or non p) 
also accounts for the fact that polar interrogatives are expected to be answered with a yes 
or no. 
This is not the case for alternative questions, whose design constrains the interlocutor 
to answer by specifying which alternative is chosen (p
1
 or p
2
): such questions cannot be 
answered simply with a yes or with a no. However, in both types of questions the 
questioner’s expectations are neutral: Lanie’s alternative question (example (2)) is not 
oriented more in favour of p
1
 than of p
2
; nor is Kim’s polar interrogative (example (3)) 
oriented more in favour of p than of non p, i.e. yes more than no (or vice versa). Either 
type of answer is expected in equal measure. 
Kim’s question is directed at Mark’s knowing position (Mark knows the information, he 
is the more knowledgeable of the two, in Heritage’s terminology). In providing the required 
information from his knowing position (Yeah. Customers), he aligns with Kim’s 
expectations. 
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2.8 Tag questions 
Definition 
Tag questions are “declaratively formatted turns that assert a proposition and add a ‘turn-
final element’ that marks questionhood: these turn-final elements include question particles 
(e.g., Japanese ka), lexical items (e.g., ‘Right’ or ‘Yeah?’) or ‘tag’ type clauses (e.g., ‘Don’t 
ya think?’ or ‘Did she?’)” (Stivers and Enfield 2010: 2622).  
 
Indeed, a tag question is typically “a way of requesting information, normally confirmation 
of the assertion made in the declarative component of the utterance” (Heritage 2012a: 14).  
 
Example (4) 
One of the two examples given by Stivers (2010: 2774) is the following: 
 
Kim: (Very good.) 
(6.5) 
Mark: Not bad for free huh? 
(0.3)  
Kim: Hm mm 
 
Mark’s question, like all tag questions, is formed by a declarative component (Not bad for 
free) and a tag component (huh?). At the beginning of the declarative component, the 
expression It is is implicit, so the tag component can be understood as equivalent to is it?, 
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the whole question thus resulting in [It is] not bad for free, is it?  Kim’s answer (Hm mm) 
can be understood as equivalent to Yes, yes. 
The declarative component ([It is] not bad for free) is an assertion coming from the 
knowing position. In particular, since it includes the expression it is not bad, the assertion 
is an evaluation, concerning a matter that is subject to opinion (Stivers gives no contextual 
information). To be clear, such an assertion is different from Heritage’s example You 
talked to John, didn’t you? (section 0.1), where the assertion is factual, not evaluative. As 
for the tag component is it (bad for free)?, it is a question in itself, the very ‘question part’ 
of the whole tag question: in isolation, it  would be a polar interrogative and its epistemic 
design would be I do not know whether (or not) it is bad for free (uncertain position). 
The global meaning of the whole tag question is somewhat different from the simple 
sum of the two component parts (an assertion and a polar interrogative), it is something 
more. Indeed, the tag element, placed immediately after the assertion, retrospectively 
colours the assertion with a tinge of supposition. The assertion no longer comes from the 
knowing position: if it came from the knowing position, the result would be a tag question 
like (I know that) it is not bad for free, is it? that would be incongruous. The assertion, 
when followed by the tag component, becomes a supposition: (I think that) it is not bad for 
free, is it? This reading of the assertion as a supposition is bolstered by the fact that the 
assertion is evaluative.  
The question design conveys that, between the possible alternatives non p (it is not 
bad for free) and p (it is bad for free), Mark is inclined to think that non p is more likely than 
p. The lexicalised negative alternative it is not bad for free, i.e. the alternative that Mark 
makes explicit, is the one he is more inclined to believe true. Being a supposition, he asks 
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for confirmation. As Heritage (2010: 48) claims, in comparison with a polar interrogative, a 
tag question “conveys a strong hunch as to the likelihood of a particular response and a 
shallower “K- to K+” epistemic gradient”. Thus, in our case, asking for confirmation means 
that Mark wants to know whether Kim shares his supposition (or not), i.e. whether Kim also 
thinks that it is not bad for free. The expected, preferred response is yes. Mark hopes that 
Kim shares his supposition. By answering affirmatively, Kim confirms this.  
The whole question-answer pair can be paraphrased as follows:  
 
Mark: I think that it is not bad for free, and I do not know whether you think the same as I 
do, that it is not bad for free, or whether instead you think, differently from me, that it is bad 
for free.  
Kim: Yes, I share your supposition, I think, like you, that it is not bad for free.  
 
The epistemic design of Mark’s question can be represented as:  
 
 (d) I do not know whether it is not bad for free (or it is), but I am inclined to believe that it is 
not. 
 
The expression I am inclined to believe that… indicates that the questioner is advancing a 
supposition. More formally, the epistemic design of tag questions may be represented as 
follows: 
 
(d
1
) I do not know whether + p (or non p) but I am inclined to believe that p 
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In the epistemic continuum of the uncertain position, Mark’s question comes from a point 
nearer to the believing (B) than to the not knowing whether (NKW) pole and it is addressed 
to an equivalent point in Kim’s uncertain position14. Kim’s answer functions in the same 
way. Therefore, the question-response pair is aligned (B-B) and Kim’s response is Mark’s 
preferred one: questioner and answerer share the same opinion. 
Our reading of these tag questions that, like Mark’s one, are addressed to the 
interlocutor’s believing position rather than to the knowing position, as in Heritage’s 
example You talked to John, didn’t you? (section 0.1), is more evident in the second 
example given by Stivers (2010: 2774), since both the tag element and the interlocutor’s 
response include the verb to think: 
  
Example (5)  
Jess: That’s kind of a lot for breakfast don’t=ya think?, 
Mike: Nah::, I thin’ iz- I think it’s great.  
 
For our purposes, the presence of kind of in the declarative component of Jess’s question 
is superfluous. Since That’s is equivalent to That is and don’t=ya think? to don’t you think?, 
we will use the clean version of Jess’s question That is a lot for breakfast, don’t you think?  
The declarative component is an evaluative assertion as previously in example (4) 
(that is a lot for breakfast sounds like that is (possibly too) much for breakfast). The 
                                                           
14
 For simplicity’s sake, we say that the question comes from the believing pole of the uncertain position; to 
simplify further, we say that it comes from the uncertain position. 
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embedded clause [that] that’s a lot for breakfast is implied in don’t you think?, this turn-final 
element being properly defined as an “imputation” (Bolinger 1957: 18) rather than a tag 
proper as Stivers and Enfield (2010) suggest. Imputations, unlike tag questions featuring 
auxiliary verbs, are subordinate to a superordinate clause and may “be inverted with little 
change in meaning” (Bolinger 1957: 18-19). In other words, That is a lot for breakfast, 
don’t you think? is equivalent to Don’t you think [that] that is a lot for breakfast?, the only 
perceptible difference being that fronting the superordinate clause makes it more 
prominent. 
Thus, the proposition p that Jess makes reference to in don’t you think? is you do not 
think [that] that is a lot for breakfast (note that the introducing proposition is negative, while 
the embedded one is positive). This is equivalent to you think [that] that is not a lot for 
breakfast (here the introducing proposition is positive, the embedded one is negative, cf. 
for instance Bolinger 1957: 94).  
The epistemic design of Jess’s question can be represented as  
 
I do not know whether you think [that] that is a lot for breakfast (or you think [that] that is 
not a lot for breakfast), but I am inclined to believe that it is 
 
Such a representation shows that the real alternatives are two opposite opinions (you think 
that…) and that the questioner is advancing a supposition in favour of the positive one. 
As in example (4), here too the tag element contributes a nuance of supposition to the 
declarative component. The question design conveys that, between the two possible 
alternatives, Jess is inclined to think that the lexicalised (positive) one that is a lot for 
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breakfast is more likely to be true than the implicit (negative) alternative and she hopes 
that Mike will also share her supposition. Jess’s whole question can be paraphrased as 
follows: I think that it is a lot for breakfast (declarative component), and I do not know 
whether you also think that it is a lot or whether instead you think, differently from me, that 
it is not (tag component). Thus, she asks for confirmation of her supposition. The 
expected, preferred answer from Mike would be “Yes! I think, as you do, that it is a lot for 
breakfast”. Instead, Mike’s answer is “No!” (= I don’t think, unlike you, that it is a lot for 
breakfast), which is equivalent to “Differently from you, I think that it is not a lot for 
breakfast”. Indeed, after the negation he adds the follow-up “I think it is great”, which 
explicitly communicates an opinion (I think) that is the opposite of Jess’s. 
From an epistemic perspective, Jess’s question comes from a point nearer to the 
believing pole of her uncertain position and it is addressed to an equivalent point in Mike’s 
uncertain position. So is Mike’s answer. Question and answer are thus formally aligned 
from the epistemic point of view (B-B), but there is no agreement: the content of Mike’s 
answer is not what Jess wants to hear, i.e. it is the dis-preferred reply (Pomerantz and 
Heritage 2014). 
 
2.9 Declarative questions 
Definition 
 “These utterances can be considered questions because of what they are about and 
because they make relevant a yes or no answer after their production […]. In these cases, 
if the speaker ‘states’ something s/he cannot know as well as the recipient, confirmation or 
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disconfirmation by the recipient is relevant and the latter typically treats the utterance as a 
question” (Rossano 2010: 2762).  
If we return to Heritage’s epistemic gradient in Figure 1 (section 1.1), the declarative 
question Q4 You talked to John? is the farthest from the questioner’s K- position and the 
nearest to the answerer’s K+ position. Q4 “asserts a possible answer to the question with 
some degree of certainty, and thus embodies a much smaller (or flatter) epistemic 
gradient. In general, declarative questions claim a more nearly equal epistemic footing with 
the respondent than do interrogatives15, and are more frequently used to seek confirmation 
for information that is already ‘in play’” (Heritage and Raymond 2012: 181). 
“This latter format is predominantly used when the speaker has already been told (or 
independently knows) the information requested and merely seeks to reconfirm or 
alternatively to convey inferences, assumptions, or other kinds of ‘best guesses’” (Heritage 
2010: 48-49). 
 
Example (6) 
The following example (Stivers 2010: 2774) is the continuation of example (1): Mike has 
just told Jess that the boxing training costs sixty-nine dollars a month and that it takes 
place six times a week.  
 
Jess: I: don’t think so. 
(0.5) 
Mike: >You ’on’ wanna do that,< 
                                                           
15
 With the term interrogatives here Heritage is referring to the other types of question Q1, Q2 and Q3. 
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Jess: No::t ((head shaking)) thuh six days uh wee:k_() 
But I mean I wanna do it, 
 
Jess (I don’t think so) seems to lose interest in the boxing training: it is expensive and, 
most of all, requires attendance virtually every day. Mike follows up with a declarative 
sentence (You don’t wanna do that) that communicates what he has inferred from Jess’s 
previous turns: he assumes that she intends to give up on the idea of boxing training. 
In isolation or in a different turn sequence, You don’t wanna do that would be an 
assertion coming from the knowing position, since it includes no uncertainty markers, 
whether lexical or morphosyntactic, and does not feature inversion. However, given its 
particular place in the turn sequence (after Jess’s I don’t think so and previous turns) and 
its specific semantic content, i.e. that it concerns Jess’s intentions, a territory in which only 
Jess has epistemic primacy (Heritage and Raymond 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006), 
the assertion sounds more like a best guess (uncertain position).  
Compared to a tag question, the declarative question You don’t wanna do that 
“proposes a still stronger commitment to the likelihood that the respondent […]” does not 
want to do that “and a correspondingly shallow “K- to K+” epistemic gradient” (Heritage 
2010: 48). In other words, Mike’s epistemic commitment towards the truth of p is very high, 
close to certainty, i.e. to his knowing position: he is almost, but not completely, certain that 
p, therefore he asks for confirmation. This is why Jess interprets Mark’s turn as a 
declarative question, i.e. as a request for confirmation of the validity of his best guess, 
despite the lack of both the rising tone (as in the case of a polar interrogative) and tag 
component (as in the case of a tag question). As a result, she replies from her knowing 
 position that she wants to do boxi
For our purposes, it can be 
and the corresponding assertion
follows. The simple assertion comes from a knowing
tell you that I know that you don’t wanna do that. If the 
functioning as a declarative question and not simply as an assertion, the questioner must 
have at least a minimum degree of uncertain
tell you that I’m almost but not completely certain
confirmation. In this sense, declarative questions also
uncertain position, which is the cl
Jess’s intentions, but he has a strong hunch in this respect. 
Figure 3 summarises the main 
 
 
Figure 3: Questioner’s unknowing and uncertain position
information or confirmation seeking (see footnote 13)
  
ng training but not six times a week. 
useful to compare the declarative question in
. The difference between them can be explained as 
 position and can be paraphrased as: I 
same sequence of words is 
ty. Such a question can be paraphrased as: I 
 that p, therefore I ask you for 
 come from the believing pole
osest to the knowing position. Mike cannot be sure about 
 
points made in Part 1: 
s, questions design and their functions. Polar interrogatives can be either 
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3. Part 2: Are dubitative questions more uncertain than plain questions? 
3.1 Aims  
Part 2 answers research questions 3 and 4 outlined in section 1.4: what empirical 
evidence can support the claim that polar and alternative questions can be dubitative while 
wh-questions cannot; and what effect the presence of a ULM in polar and alternative 
questions has on the questioners’ epistemic commitment, as compared to the 
corresponding plain questions. 
 
3.2 Methodology  
In order to answer research question 3, Stivers and Enfield’s linguistic tests maybe and I 
wonder if (section 1.3.1) are systematically applied to examples 1-6 discussed in Part 1. 
An additional corpus-based study of the use of maybe and I wonder if in the five question 
types offers empirical support for our claims. 
 To answer research question 4, plain questions are compared with their 
corresponding dubitative ones.  
 
3.3 Dubitative wh-questions 
The problem of whether wh-questions can be dubitative was touched upon in section 1.3.1 
and the answer was negative (*“How is maybe the weather outside?”). Subsequently, in 
section 2.4, it was shown that wh-questions come from the unknowing position, and it is for 
this reason that they cannot be dubitative. 
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If we apply the maybe test to Jess’s question How much does it cost to train?, we 
have, in principle, five possible dubitative versions, none of which is grammatically 
acceptable, irrespective of where maybe is inserted:  
 
*Maybe how much does it cost to train? 
*How much maybe does it cost to train? 
*How much does it maybe cost to train? 
*How much does it cost maybe to train? 
*How much does it cost to train maybe? 
 
As seen in section 2.5, this can be explained by reference to the function of wh- questions, 
i.e. that they “ask for specification of an unknown element” (Biber et al. 1999: 208). In the 
example question, the speaker indicates clearly via the syntax that she is certain that 
training has a cost, but ignorant of the precise nature of that cost in terms of dollars. 
Modalising such a question would be incongruous, since it would re-frame the definite but 
unspecified element (the cost) as indefinite or uncertain, thus undermining the 
communicative intention of the question. 
The application of the I wonder if test also results in an unacceptable sentence: 
  
*I wonder if how much it costs to train 
 
If, on the contrary, we add only I wonder, the resulting indirect question is acceptable: 
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I wonder how much it costs to train 
 
The linguistic behaviour of the two expressions I wonder and I wonder if is similar to that of 
I do not know and I do not know whether, respectively (see section 1.6). The former 
expressions (I wonder and I do not know) suit only wh-questions, while the latter (I wonder 
if and I do not know whether) suit only polar and alternative questions. Thus, Stivers and 
Enfield (2010) are correct in not extending point 7 of their coding scheme to wh-questions. 
They cannot be made dubitative, i.e. they cannot admit the presence of a ULM, because 
they come from the unknowing position, not the uncertain.  
As said at the end of section 2.6, wh-questions do not refer to questioners’ uncertainty 
between two alternatives, but to their ignorance regarding a particular piece of information 
which is known to exist: the wh-word acts as a pro-form for that information. Everything is 
known, certain, except for one element, leaving one piece of the questioner’s cognitive 
jigsaw missing: in the example provided, this is how much the training costs. The unknown 
element cannot be cast into doubt, because it is presupposed to be true (i.e. training costs 
something), rather than merely possible, or uncertain (maybe training costs something, 
maybe not). For this reason, wh-questions cannot include a ULM. The definite but 
unspecified element marked by the wh-word allows for no uncertainty, only un-knowledge.  
 
3.4 Uncertain questions and corresponding dubitative forms 
In the following sections, the maybe and I wonder if tests are applied to all four types of 
question that come from the uncertain position to show that, for this reason, they can admit 
a ULM. The further aim is to uncover any changes in the questioner’s epistemic 
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commitment when using such questions, in comparison with their corresponding plain 
questions. 
Concerning this latter aim, it is plausible to advance two hypotheses. The first is that 
the insertion of maybe would neither enhance nor diminish the degree of uncertainty: the 
plain question is already uncertain at the morphosyntactic level, so the adverb would be 
superfluous, redundant. The presence of a ULM would therefore have no epistemic weight 
in such questions, plain and corresponding dubitative questions being equally uncertain to 
the same degree. The second hypothesis is that adding maybe would increase the 
uncertainty: one morphosyntactic marker of uncertainty (the plain question) plus one 
lexical marker of uncertainty (the adverb maybe) would double the uncertainty, thus 
making the dubitative versions more uncertain than the plain questions. 
Sections 3.5-3.8 give a negative answer to the first hypothesis: the questioner’s 
commitment is not indifferent to the presence of maybe. Moreover, as regards the second 
hypothesis, it is shown that, while tag and declarative questions, which come from the B 
pole, indeed become more uncertain, alternative questions and polar interrogatives, which 
come from the NKW pole, become, paradoxically, less uncertain.  
 
3.5 Dubitative alternative questions 
Stivers and Enfield (2010) make no mention of dubitative alternative questions in their 
description of alternative questions, although they do in principle exist (see section 
1.3.1).16 Alternative questions admit the presence of a ULM, because their 
                                                           
16
 We presume that none were present in their data, thus giving no reason for the authors to mention them in 
their coding scheme. 
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morphosyntactic design is already uncertain. Indeed, if we apply the I wonder if test to 
Lanie’s question Were you drunk or were you sober? (example (2), section 2.6), we have 
an acceptable sentence: 
 
I wonder if you were drunk or you were sober 
 
If we apply the maybe test, we achieve the following acceptable dubitative questions: 
 
(2a) Were you maybe drunk or were you sober? 
(2b) Were you drunk maybe or were you sober? 
(2c) Were you drunk or were you maybe sober? 
(2d) Were you drunk or were you sober maybe? 
 
In these examples, we see that maybe can occur in clause-medial or -final position, in 
either one of the two clauses. These positions affect the meaning. In (2a) and (2c) the 
medial position restricts the scope of maybe to the adjective immediately following, while in 
(2b) and (2d) maybe in clause-final position extends over the entire clause to which it 
belongs. It must be stressed, however, that it does not range over the complete, dual-
clause proposition (alternative questions being composed of two juxtaposed clauses): the 
presence of the coordinating or blocks the extension of the modal meaning beyond the 
clause in which it occurs. 
Interesting pragmatic inferences may emerge, as in this particular example, which 
addresses a theme – drunkenness and sobriety – which is associated with strong cultural 
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norms. In both (2a) and (2b), maybe interacts with the adjective drunk, conveying the 
notion that this is not a habitual state. In (2c) and (2d), it is sober that is presented as not 
being the normal state, hence the inference that the interlocutor is presumed to be a 
habitual drinker17. 
From an epistemic perspective, some differences emerge between the plain 
alternative question and its dubitative versions. In the first place, the addition of maybe to 
either one of the alternatives converts it into a supposition. This seems to have the 
function of conveying to the interlocutor that, between the alternatives p
1
 and p
2
, the 
questioner is inclined to believe that the modalised one is more likely than the other. In 
other words, the addition of maybe allows the speaker to indicate a preference for one of 
the two options proposed and encourages the interlocutor to favour the alternative that has 
been framed as dubitative. 
Plain alternative questions come from the NKW pole, where the degree of uncertainty 
between the two alternatives is in perfect equilibrium (section 2.6). The addition of maybe 
upsets this balance by favouring the modalised alternative. In Lanie’s plain question, p
1
 
and p
2 
are equally possible: when maybe is added, the modalised alternative has more 
probability of being true than the other. Contrary therefore to the hypothesis that the 
addition of a ULM like maybe to a plain alternative question would increase its degree of 
                                                           
17
 It goes without saying that, because of the semantic meaning of the adjectives and the pragmatic 
inferences that these give rise to perhaps both (2c) and (2d) are less likely to occur in real speech than (2a) 
or (2b). In principle, however, and in other contexts with other expressions, the modality could be positioned 
in either of the two clauses, in medial or final position, although Biber et al. (1999: 872) note that placing 
stance adverbials in final position is typical of conversational English. 
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uncertainty, modalised alternative questions seem to be less uncertain than their plain 
equivalents. 
Since this may seem counter-intuitive, let us lay bare its mechanisms. If the NKW pole 
(and the plain alternative questions coming from it) is understood as maximum uncertainty, 
the addition of maybe cannot increase that maximum (there can be no ‘more than 
maximum’!). There is no further uncertainty beyond the NKW pole, i.e. beyond that side of 
the uncertain epistemic continuum which represents maximum uncertainty. It is here that 
the unknowing position begins. 
The presence of a ULM appears to push alternative questions from the NKW pole in 
the direction of the B pole where tag questions lie. The questioner adds maybe to indicate 
a preference for the modalised alternative and, in doing so, his/her commitment shifts from 
equal probability towards unequal probability. Simultaneously, his/her epistemic position is 
no longer one of maximum uncertainty, but of lower uncertainty (or greater certainty), and 
the function of the question is less information-seeking than confirmation-seeking (see 
Figure 4). The expected answer, in turn, is no longer neutral but favours the modalised 
alternative over the non-modalised one. 
 
3.6 Dubitative polar interrogatives 
In section 1.3 we saw that, in English, polar interrogatives (“Is it snowing outside?”) can be 
made dubitative (“Is it maybe snowing outside?”). Epistemically speaking, this is possible 
because they come from the questioner’s uncertain position. Indeed, in section 2.7 we 
demonstrated that the epistemic design of polar interrogatives is already uncertain at the 
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morphosyntactic level, i.e. even without the presence of a ULM. For the same reason, they 
may admit a ULM, i.e. they can be made dubitative.  
If we apply the maybe test to Kim’s plain polar interrogative Did anybody say anything 
about the bar today? (example (3), section 2.7), we can make it dubitative in a number of 
ways, some of which are more acceptable than others: 
 
(3a) Did anybody maybe say anything about the bar today? 
(3b) Did anybody say anything about the bar today, maybe? 
 
The meanings that arise in (3a) and (3b) differ slightly depending on the position of maybe 
in the sentence. As we explained in the previous section, the scope of some adverbials 
covers the entire proposition in a clause, while in others its range is restricted, focusing on 
one particular clause element (Biber et al. 1999: 775). In (3a), medially-positioned maybe 
focuses the modality on the verb say. If placed in final position, as in (3b), its scope 
extends over the entire proposition, focusing on no clause element in particular. 
As far as the I wonder if test is concerned, its application to example (3) also gives an 
acceptable sentence:  
 
I wonder if anybody said anything about the bar today (or not). 
 
It now remains for us to investigate what differences there are, from an epistemic 
perspective, between the plain polar interrogative (3) and its dubitative versions (3a) and 
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(3b). The situation is similar to the one described in connection with dubitative alternative 
questions (section 3.5). 
In Kim’s plain polar interrogative Did anybody say anything about the bar today? 
(section 2.7), both alternatives (the explicit p, somebody said something, and the implicit 
non p, nobody said anything) are equally possible, have the same probability of being true. 
For this reason, they are information-seeking: questioners’ expectations are neutral with 
respect to a yes or a no response. 
The addition of maybe makes the explicit p a supposition (maybe somebody said 
something), i.e. gives it more probability of being true. As a result, p and non p, which in 
Kim’s plain question were equally possible, are no longer equally possible in the modalised 
question. The dubitative question design conveys that the modalised alternative (Did 
anybody maybe say anything about the bar today?) is more likely to be true than the plain, 
i.e. non modalised, question (Did anybody say anything about the bar today?). 
As we saw in section 3.5 in relation to alternative questions, the addition of a ULM to a 
dubitative polar interrogative seems not to add further uncertainty, but to diminish it (i.e. to 
add certainty instead). Like alternative questions, plain polar interrogatives come from the 
NKW pole where uncertainty is maximal (50% - 50%). We have already explained (section 
3.5) that it is impossible to go beyond ‘maximum’, so the addition of maybe cannot have 
that function. Instead – perhaps unexpectedly – it does the opposite, i.e. it reduces 
maximum uncertainty for the lexicalised alternative, presenting it as somewhat more likely 
than its implicit counterpart. 
When a speaker’s epistemic stance shifts from maximally uncertain between two 
alternatives towards a slight preference in favour of one of them, it moves towards the B 
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pole. Thus, it appears to be the case that the presence of a ULM in a polar interrogative 
(as in dubitative alternative questions) confers upon it some of the features normally 
associated with tag questions: the implied higher likelihood of the modalised proposition 
converts the question from a purely information-seeking one into one that is (also) 
confirmation-seeking. Indeed, the expected response to (3a) and (3b) is more in favour of 
a yes than of a no. Questioners’ expectations are no longer neutral as they would be in 
plain polar interrogatives.  
 
3.7 Dubitative tag questions 
Tag questions may admit a ULM, but only within the declarative component, i.e. the part of 
the question where the speaker indicates his/her certainty or uncertainty. Modalising the 
tag component would invalidate its primary function, which is to elicit confirmation or 
agreement of the semantic content of the superordinate clause to which it is attached 
(Biber et al. 1999: 208). 
As discussed above (section 2.8), the elements described by Stivers and Enfield 
(2010) as ‘tag elements’ do not belong to a single grammatical class. Tag questions proper 
echo the main verb of the clause that they are attached to, e.g., “It is not bad for free, is 
it?”. Also included amongst Stivers and Enfield’s tag elements is a very different form, in 
which the tag element features an introductory verb: “don’t you think?”. We will see that 
these structural differences influence the capacity for tags to be modalised. 
If we apply the maybe test to example (4) (section 2.8) It is not bad for free, is it? we 
have for instance: 
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(4a) It is maybe not bad for free, is it?  
 
which is an acceptable dubitative tag question. Since the declarative component is a plain 
assertion, it can be made dubitative. The same holds true for example (5) (section 2.8), 
That is a lot for breakfast, don’t you think? where we have, for example: 
 
(5a) Maybe that is a lot for breakfast, don’t you think?  
(5b) That is maybe a lot for breakfast, don’t you think?  
 
Both examples (5a) and (5b) admit maybe, since such questions come from the uncertain 
position and their design is already uncertain at the morphosyntactic level.  
If we apply the I wonder if test to the declarative component of the examples (4) and 
(5) we have two acceptable sentences: 
 
I wonder if it is not bad for free  
I wonder if it is a lot for breakfast 
 
What remains for us to ascertain is whether maybe adds uncertainty to the plain 
question. In section 2.8, we saw that the design of tag questions conveys that, between 
the possible alternatives p and non p, the questioner is inclined to believe that the 
lexicalised alternative is the more likely of the two. The addition of maybe mitigates the 
supposition, making it somewhat less probable. Whereas the addition of the adverb to 
polar interrogatives and alternative questions lowers the degree of uncertainty (sections 
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2.5 and 2.6), in tag questions such an addition raises it. From an epistemic perspective, 
the difference between the plain tag questions (4) and (5) and their corresponding 
dubitative versions (4a), (5a), (5b) is that the latter, due to the mitigating, hedging function 
of maybe, are shifted towards the NKW pole, thus becoming less probable than their 
corresponding plain versions: the questioners’ commitment towards the lexicalised 
alternative is now more uncertain. 
 
3.8 Dubitative declarative questions 
We saw in section 2.9 that a declarative question like example (6) You don’t wanna do that 
has the morphosyntactic structure of an assertion. Now we want to show why a declarative 
question, whether seen as an assertion or as a question, admits the presence of a ULM. 
As an assertion, it comes from the knowing position. Assertions can be made dubitative, 
so we can also have some dubitative versions of example (6), such as 
 
(6a) Maybe you don’t wanna do that 
(6b) You maybe don’t wanna do that 
(6c) You don’t wanna do that maybe 
 
In examples (6a) - (6c), we see maybe in clause-initial, -medial and -final positions 
respectively. As already mentioned, the scope of medial maybe (6b) is restricted to its 
nearest neighbour (here the verb do), while final maybe (6c) extends back over the entire 
clause in which it occurs, modalising it retrospectively. Initial position maybe (6a) has a 
similarly extended scope, but its clause-initial position also adds prominence (as do all 
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cases of fronting in English), the uncertainty being expressed before – and therefore 
framing – the proposition. 
As a question, we saw that You don’t wanna do that comes from the farthest part of 
the B pole. Also for this reason, it can admit maybe. 
The I wonder if test can also be applied successfully: 
 
I wonder if you don’t wanna do that 
 
It is interesting to examine, from an epistemic perspective, what difference there is, if any, 
between the plain declarative question and its dubitative versions, for instance Maybe you 
don’t wanna do that.  
As stated in section 2.9, the design of the plain declarative question conveys that Mike 
is almost completely certain that Jess doesn’t wanna do that: ‘Almost completely’ means 
that his degree of uncertainty is minimal. It is precisely this minimal uncertainty that 
differentiates the question from its corresponding assertion and turns it into a strong 
assumption, i.e. that Jess doesn’t wanna do that.  
For these reasons, in our view, adding maybe to the plain declarative question lowers 
its high degree of certainty and, at the same time, raises its minimal level of uncertainty. In 
other words, maybe changes the proportion of certainty and uncertainty, demoting the 
epistemic rank of the declarative question to that expressed by a tag question. The 
questioner’s epistemic commitment changes: maybe undermines the status of the 
declarative question and alters its position along the epistemic uncertain continuum (see 
Figure 4): from the B pole the declarative question moves towards the NKW pole, i.e. 
 towards the place where tag questions
plain question, in the dubitative version the questioner’s 
lexicalised alternative shifts from more pr
In the plain forms of declarative
maximal and that of uncertainty minimal. Adding a
and correspondingly increases the uncertainty. In many
since it is widely understood that modalis
What is important to note, however, is that adding 
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We have already seen that this happens when 
and polar interrogatives. Here, 
of uncertainty, and correspondingly
be understood as expressing a preference for the modalis
 
 are situated. In comparison with the corresponding 
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obable to less probable. 
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 stance adverb reduces the certainty 
 respects, this is not surprising, 
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Figure 4: Dubitative questions 
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Figure 4 summarises the main points made in Part 2, as a result of the application of 
Stivers and Enfield’s linguistic tests maybe and I wonder if and of the comparison between 
plain and corresponding dubitative questions.  
 
3.9 Corpus-based evidence  
The claim that polar and alternative questions can be dubitative, while wh-questions 
cannot, finds support in spoken corpus data. To address the particular arguments being 
advanced, we investigated the use of I wonder if / I wonder whether and maybe in these 
question types using the Spoken British National Corpus (BNC) 2014 (Love et al. 2017)18 
so that the theoretical points raised could be tested against authentic language data and 
subjected to quantitative analysis. Since the corpus analysed by Stivers (2010) is not 
available to other researchers, some alternative data set was by necessity required. The 
choice to use the Spoken BNC2014 seemed the only sensible one available by virtue of its 
being (i) the most recently-compiled and (ii) the largest existing corpus of spoken English 
(of any variety). Both because one of the authors is a native speaker of British English and 
because no emphasis was made by Stivers as to any peculiarly American features of her 
data, we cannot consider this difference to be significant. Moreover, our aim was not to 
compare and contrast British/American forms but rather to test how markers of uncertainty 
affect the epistemic value of question forms, which were not addressed in Stivers' study. 
This subsection presents the findings from this corpus-based study.  
                                                           
18
 “The 11.5-million-word spoken component of the BNC2014 contains transcripts of recorded conversations, 
gathered from members of the UK public between 2012 and 2016. The conversations were recorded in informal 
settings (typically at home) and took place among friends and family members. An innovative aspect of the corpus is 
that the speakers recorded their conversations using the built-in audio recording device in their smartphones. The 
corpus comprises 1,251 conversations, featuring a total of 672 speakers” (http://corpora.lancs.ac.uk/bnc2014/ , last 
accessed 09 January 2018). 
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3.9.1 I wonder if / whether 
In order to identify the distribution of I wonder if / I wonder whether in such question types, 
we queried the data set with the simple search strings I wonder if and I wonder whether. 
Since I wonder if / whether are among the most widely-used formulae introducing 
indirect questions, as Stivers and Enfield (2010) themselves claim in their coding scheme 
(section 1.3.1), it was expected that a high number of such indirect questions would be 
found in the corpus. Indeed, the query returned 390 matches in 265 different 
conversations for I wonder if and 24 matches in 22 different conversations for I wonder 
whether. Out of 390 occurrences of I wonder if, 18 were found in indirect alternative 
questions; the remaining occurrences were found in indirect polar interrogatives. It is 
important to note that the combination of I wonder if / whether and interrogative pronouns 
(why, where, when, who, what, which, how) was entirely absent in the data. These results 
confirm the hypothesis underlying research question 3 as regards I wonder if / whether; 
the case of maybe is more complex and is discussed separately. 
 
3.9.2. Maybe 
Searching corpora for patterns featuring maybe requires some skill, since the word is 
extremely common and not normally associated with interrogative sentences. To identify 
the distribution of maybe as a dubitative marker in the above mentioned question types, 
we used regular expressions to formulate the search string. The string maybe ******* 
_{$} </u> allowed us to extract all occurrences of maybe to be found within 7 words of a 
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punctuation boundary and change of speaker turn19. This query returned 376 matches in 
287 different conversations. All the occurrences were manually analysed by the authors to 
(a) remove those occurrences in which maybe was not associated with a question and (b) 
classify the different question types. The interobserver agreement (Cohen’s Kappa 
coefficient) was 0.82, indicating an almost perfect agreement. Of the initial return of 376 
occurrences, the number of examples classified as questions including maybe was 192. 
Frequency data analysis was performed using the SPSS software package. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The label “unclassified questions” refers to questions with an implicit auxiliary or missing main verb: the absence of the verb makes it 
impossible to reconstruct the syntax, specifically to ascertain whether there is subject-verb inversion. As a result, the question cannot be 
reliably construed as polar interrogative or declarative. 
 
Specifically, as shown in Figure 5, almost half (43.8%) of the 192 maybe questions are 
declarative questions; 17.2% are polar interrogatives, 6.3% are alternative questions and 
5.7% are tag questions. No wh-questions including maybe were identified.  
After taking into consideration the unclassified questions (27.1%), which can be either 
polar interrogatives or declarative questions (but not tag-questions or alternative 
                                                           
19
 CQPweb regular expression syntax is explained in https://cqpweb.lancs.ac.uk/doc/cqpweb-simple-syntax-help.pdf , 
last accessed 09 January 2018) 
Question types Frequency % 
Alternative questions 
Polar interrogatives 
Tag questions 
Declarative questions 
Unclassified questions* 
Total 
12 6.3 
33 17.2 
11 5.7 
84 43.8 
52 27.1 
192 100.0 
Table 1: Frequency and percentage of question types including maybe   
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questions, which are easily identified by their syntactic form), we end up with 88.1% of 
questions including maybe being declarative and/or polar interrogatives (43.8% declarative 
questions + 17.2% polar interrogatives + 27.1% unclassified questions = 88.1%). 
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of question types including maybe. 
 
3.9.3. Examples from SpokenBNC2014 
Alternative questions 
S8J6 2520 
S0115: so yeah so that (.) so you 're saying a butternut squash does it taste like a  
pumpkin or a bit sweeter maybe?  
S0037: well I tend- like we had some just in the soup last week so I do n't even know if  
it's like what it's like on its own really (.) I like the shape  
 
Polar Interrogatives 
SN22 1165 
S0074: is that something you 're going to do again in the future maybe?  
S0018: that's something that I hope I do n't have to do  
Tag questions  
                                                           
20
 The ID code for each file is provided for reference. 
44%
27%
17%
6%
6%
Question types including maybe
declarative questions
unclassified questions
polar interrogatives
alternative questions
tag questions
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S4QF 2540 
S0252: it's very er flexible maybe is n't it?  
S0368: yeah it 's  
 
Declarative questions 
SG4J 832 
S0024: maybe we can buy some at the shop?  
S0144: well if the shop 's open (.) 
 
Unclassified questions 
S5PF 643 
S0073: >> I 've never eaten pork (.) I do n't think I 've ever eaten pork (.) I 've eaten  
bacon and I 've eaten pepperoni  
S0162: maybe ham?  
S0073: ham I 've never eaten  
 
3.9.4. Chi-squared 
The non-parametric chi-squared test was applied to verify if the presence of maybe in 
questions is significantly related to specific question types. The test reveals that the 
difference is statistically significant (χ2 = 97.427, df = 4, p-value < .000): the use of maybe 
is considerably more frequent in declarative questions and less frequent in alternative and 
tag questions. The observed and expected frequencies of maybe in polar interrogatives 
are similar.   
The results shown in Table 1, Figure 5 and the chi-squared test strongly support the 
claims that polar interrogatives, alternative, tag and declarative questions may include 
maybe, since they come from the uncertain position; and that wh-questions cannot include 
maybe, since they come from the unknowing position.   
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3.9.5. Position of maybe in questions 
An additional examination of the 192 dubitative questions was carried out to identify the 
syntactic position of maybe: initial, medial, or final (sections 3.5-2.8). The interobserver 
agreement was 0.89, indicating an almost perfect agreement.  
As shown in Table 2, the initial position is used in almost half (49%) of occurrences; 
final position is used just over a third of the time (35.4%) and medial position is clearly the 
least favoured. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.9.6. Chi-squared 
Independently of the question type, the difference between the three possible positions of 
maybe is statistically significant (χ2 = 32.375 df = 2, p-value < .000): the initial position is 
the preferred one, and the medial the least common. The observed/expected frequencies 
of final position are close. 
 
3.9.7. Question types and position of maybe 
Finally, as shown in Table 3, question types and position of maybe were compared. 
The preferred position of maybe changes depending on the question type. In alternative 
questions, it is mainly medial; polar interrogatives favour final position while tag and 
Position of maybe Frequency % 
Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
94 49.0 
30 15.6 
68 35.4 
192 100.0 
Table 2: Frequency and percentage of position of maybe in questions 
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declarative questions find maybe in initial position. In the unclassified questions, it is either 
initial or final, largely in line with such questions being either declarative or polar 
interrogative. 
 
Question types Position of maybe Frequency % 
 
Alternative questions Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
3 25.0 
6 50.0 
3 25.0 
12 100.0 
Polar interrogatives Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
6 18.2 
7 21.2 
20 60.6 
33 100.0 
Tag questions Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
6 54.5 
3 27.3 
2 18.2 
11 100.0 
Declarative questions Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
53 63.1 
13 15.5 
18 21.4 
84 100.0 
Unclassified questions Initial 
Medial 
Final 
Total 
26 50.0 
1 1.9 
25 48.1 
52 100.0 
 
Table 3: Frequency and percentage of question types in relation to the position of maybe 
 
3.9.8. Chi-squared 
The non-parametric chi-squared test was applied to ascertain if there are significant 
differences in the position of maybe in each question type. In alternative and tag questions 
there are no significant differences (respectively, χ2 = 1.500, df = 2, p-value < .472 and χ2 
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= 2.364, df = 2, p-value < .307), i.e. maybe is found in nearly equal proportions in the three 
different positions. However, in polar interrogatives and declarative questions the 
differences are statistically significant. Specifically, in polar interrogatives maybe is more 
frequent in final position (χ2 = 11.091, df = 2, p-value < .004), in declarative questions it is 
more frequent in initial one (χ2 = 33.929, df = 2, p-value < .000). 
 
4. Discussion and Conclusions 
There were four main aspects to the present study: to find out, from an epistemic stance 
perspective, (1) why polar and alternative questions can be made dubitative, i.e. can 
include a ULM, (2) why it is that wh-questions cannot, (3) what empirical evidence can 
support the claim that polar and alternative questions can be dubitative while wh-questions 
cannot, (4) whether the presence of a ULM in polar and alternative questions changes 
anything in the questioners’ epistemic commitment in comparison with the corresponding 
plain questions (and, if so, what changes can be identified). 
The answer to questions 1 and 2 was given in Part 1 by showing that polar and 
alternative questions can be made dubitative since they come from what we call the 
questioner’s uncertain position: for this reason, their epistemic design is already uncertain 
at the morphosyntactic, i.e. grammatical, level (the plain question forms), with no need for 
a ULM. In brief, they do not require a ULM to be uncertain, since they are already 
uncertain ‘by their very nature’. For the same reason, i.e. for their coming from the 
uncertain position, they can, in principle, include a ULM. Wh-questions, on the contrary, 
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cannot be dubitative, since they come from the unknowing, not the uncertain, position: in 
their epistemic design there is no room for un-certainty, only for un-knowledge. 
Specifically, starting from John Heritage’s epistemic gradient and sharing his 
distinction between a less knowledgeable questioner (K-) and a more knowledgeable 
respondent (K+), research questions 1 and 2 were answered by making a further 
distinction, within the K- position, between a less knowledgeable questioner who asks a 
question because s/he does not know, i.e. s/he ignores, and a less knowledgeable 
questioner who asks a question because s/he does not know whether, i.e. is uncertain. 
As a matter of fact, when transformed from direct to indirect questions, wh-questions 
require I do not know as an introducing epistemic verbal expression to form a 
grammatically acceptable sentence (section 2.5), while alternative and polar questions 
require I do not know whether… or… (sections 2.6-2.9). Uncertainty, by definition, implies 
alternatives:  the questioner is faced with at least two different possibilities, and the verbal 
expression I do not know whether…or… well conveys this sense of epistemic uncertainty. 
Our model, differently from Heritage’s, explicitly distinguishes between questioner’s 
un-knowledge and questioner’s un-certainty: while wh-questions express a lack of 
knowledge (=un-knowledge) concerning the identity of a particular piece of information 
within a proposition, a specific element, i.e. a wh-word (How much does it cost to train?), 
polar questions (interrogatives, tag and declarative questions) express a lack of certainty 
(=uncertainty) concerning the truth of a complete proposition or, as in alternative 
questions, of two propositions. In this sense, wh-questions are unknowing questions, while 
polar and alternative questions are uncertain questions. 
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Epistemic stance is not only a matter of knowing more or less (K+ or K-) than the 
interlocutor, i.e. of knowing and not knowing, as Heritage claims, but also of not knowing 
whether and believing (Zuczkowski et al. 2017; Bongelli et al. forth.). In our view, the 
epistemic expressions I do not know whether p and I believe that p refer to cognitive 
processes that are different from those referred to by I know p and I do not know p and at 
the linguistic level both correspond to a third epistemic position, the uncertain one, which 
has an epistemic status of its own. Not knowing whether (NKW) and believing (B) are the 
two poles between which the epistemic continuum of uncertainty ranges and constitute a 
third epistemic stance, the uncertain, to be added to the previous two (knowing and un-
knowing) (Figure 2). 
In the NKW pole, the degree of uncertainty is maximum: each alternative has a 50% 
probability of being true.  In the B pole, the percentage of uncertainty is minimal and that of 
certainty is almost maximal. The four types of uncertain questions (alternative, polar 
interrogatives, tag and declarative questions) place themselves in different points along 
the epistemic continuum since they express different degrees of uncertainty. 
Alternative questions (Were you drunk or were you sober?) and polar interrogatives 
(Did anybody say anything about the bar today?) are closer to the NKW pole, since for the 
questioner both alternatives (respectively, p
1
 or p
2
 and p or non p) are possibly true to the 
same degree (50%-50% probability). 
In both types of question the questioner’s expectations concerning the interlocutor’s 
response are neutral, not oriented in favour of one alternative, both are expected to the 
same degree. For this reason, such questions are information-seeking rather than 
confirmation-seeking. 
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When using tag and declarative questions, questioners move gradually from the NKW 
to the B pole, i.e. from maximum to minimum uncertainty, from equal probability to unequal 
probability in favour of the lexicalised alternative, from information (neutral expectations) to 
confirmation (non-neutral expectations) seeking. 
In tag questions (It is not bad for free, is it? – That’s a lot for breakfast, don’t you 
think?), the tag element gives the declarative component of the question the function of a 
supposition: questioners are more inclined to think that the lexicalised, explicit alternative 
is more likely to be true than the implicit one. 
Declarative questions (You don’t wanna do that) come from the farthest extremity of 
the B pole: questioners’ epistemic commitment towards the truth of p is very high, virtually 
certain that p is true; they therefore ask for confirmation. 
In all four types of uncertain questions, the questioner wants to move from uncertain, 
i.e. possible, states of affairs (for instance, Were you drunk or sober?) to a certain one, i.e. 
true, known, thanks to the recipient’s response (for instance, Yes, I was drunk). These 
uncertain states of affairs are thought of by the questioner as being equally probable in 
alternative questions and polar interrogatives21 and as being unequally probable to 
different degrees in tag and declarative questions. The expression unequally probable 
means that the lexicalised alternative is supposed to be more likely of being true than the 
non-lexicalised one. In all four types of uncertain questions, the recipient’s response is 
expected to dissolve the questioner’s uncertainty, letting the questioner know which 
possibility is true. 
                                                           
21
 As said in footnote 11, some polar interrogatives fit better in Coleman’s reading and thus are neutral, while 
others fit better in Bolinger’s reading, thus being non-neutral. 
 In wh-questions, on the contrary, questioners want to move from
affairs to a known one, i.e. certain, true.
In Figure 3 the epistemic continuum going from
pole of the uncertain position corresponds to Heritage’s epistemic gradient in Figure 1. The 
only difference between the two epistemic continua is that, in our model, Heritage’s K
further divided into two distinct epistemic positions, the unknowing and the uncertain, while 
Heritage’s K- seems to enclose the two in one unique position. In Figure 
superposition of the two models
question types). 
Figure 6: Our unknowing (U) position and NKW/B poles of the uncertain position superposed to Heritage’s K
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whether in questions was undertaken, to enrich the findings and make a quantitative 
analysis possible.  
The application of both linguistic tests to polar and alternative questions resulted in 
grammatically acceptable sentences, while to wh-questions it resulted in grammatically 
unacceptable sentences, as corroborated by the absence of such forms in the corpus 
data. Both results strongly support our claims that polar and alternative questions can 
include a ULM since they come from the uncertain position, while wh-questions cannot 
since they come from the unknowing position. 
As far as the corpus-based study is concerned, the Spoken BNC2014 data confirmed 
that (1) polar and alternative questions can be introduced by I wonder if / I wonder 
whether, while wh-questions cannot; (2) polar and alternative questions can include maybe 
(although the percentage is not high: speakers use maybe in 6.3% of alternative 
questions), but wh-questions cannot include maybe (no occurrences are present in the 
data); (3) declarative questions are the most frequently-used of the dubitative questions 
involving maybe.  
This third finding is consistent with that of Stivers (2010: 2773), according to whom 
“declarative utterances were the dominant polar question type” in spontaneous American 
English conversations. Therefore, not only are declarative questions the most widely-used 
polar questions, but they are also the most numerous of the dubitative questions including 
maybe. Although all dubitative questions can include maybe in any of the three syntactic 
positions (initial, medial and final), the statistical analysis revealed that in polar 
interrogatives maybe is more often placed in final position while in declarative questions it 
is more often found in initial position. 
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Finally, to answer the fourth research question (whether the presence of a ULM like 
maybe  in polar and alternative questions changes anything in the questioner’s epistemic 
commitment in comparison with the corresponding plain questions), the maybe test was 
applied to alternative and polar questions in order to ascertain whether the presence of 
this stance adverb adds more uncertainty to such questions, which are already uncertain 
at their grammatical design: does one grammatical marker of uncertainty (the plain 
question design) plus one lexical marker of uncertainty (the adverb maybe) double the 
degree of uncertainty in dubitative questions? 
Maybe is a stance adverb that signals the speaker’s uncertainty in the here-and-now 
of communication. In particular, in our view, it signals a supposition (or something similar: 
assumption, hunch, guess…). In saying Maybe Alex is on the beach, the speaker 
communicates that, even though s/he does not know whether Alex is on the beach or not, 
s/he nonetheless is more committed to suppose (to believe, to think) that p (Alex is on the 
beach) is more likely to be true than non p (Alex is not on the beach). In this sense, maybe 
is closer to the B than to the NKW pole: in saying Maybe Alex is on the beach, the speaker 
mitigates the corresponding assertion Alex is on the beach making it a supposition. 
Since maybe mitigates certainty, when added to questions coming from the B pole 
(like tag and declarative questions) where the degree of certainty is higher than that of 
uncertainty, the adverb mitigates the degree of certainty, i.e. reduces the higher probability 
assigned to the lexicalised alternative and correspondingly increases the lower probability 
assigned to the non-lexicalised alternative (the proportion of certainty and uncertainty still 
remaining in favour of the former). This is in accordance with the hypothesis that the 
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presence of maybe raises the degree of uncertainty (and correspondingly lowers the 
degree of certainty). 
But, when added to questions coming from the NKW pole (like alternative questions 
and polar interrogatives) where the uncertainty is maximal (50% probability to each 
alternative), the adverb mitigates what it finds there: it finds no certainty, it only finds 
uncertainty, then it mitigates uncertainty. This means that the modalised alternative is 
supposed to be less uncertain, i.e. more certain, than the plain one: the former is 
supposed to be more likely to be true than the latter (Figure 4). 
Contrary to the above-mentioned expectation and to what Stivers and Enfield (2010) 
claim, the addition of maybe makes alternative questions and polar interrogatives neither 
uncertain (since they are already so at their grammatical, plain level) nor more uncertain 
(since they already represent the maximum uncertainty). Rather, the addition of maybe 
makes them, paradoxically, less uncertain, i.e. more probable of being true. In other 
words, maybe seems to modulate (Halliday 1976, Lakoff 1972, Caffi 1999) the epistemic 
force of the uncertain questions, functioning as a hedge when added to tag and declarative 
questions, since it increases their uncertainty, and as a booster when added to alternative 
questions and polar interrogatives, since it lowers their uncertainty. 
The evidence to support these last two claims cannot be obtained through corpus 
analysis, but through psycholinguistic and cognitively-oriented investigations, which will be 
carried out in future work.  
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